Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper characterizes public and private monitoring technologies with respect to which the efficient outcome is approximately implementable in team production by way of ex post budget-balanced linear transfers. JEL Classification: D21, D23, D82.
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