The Dynamics of Information Exchange: Reevaluating the Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress

This paper examines information dissemination within legislatures and its effect on legislative decision making. Specifically, I examine the propensity for “informational cascades” to develop when members of Congress publicly announce positions on legislation. An information cascade is a pattern of conformity that arises when an individual, having observed the behavior of others, disregards his own information and follows the action of those who precede him. The cascade model predicts that legislators sometimes rationally forgo their private (constituency-based) information to “go along with the crowd.” I propose that public endorsements of legislation are not simply a reaction to constituency pressures (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zorn 1997; Mayhew 1974), but also stands as vehicle by which members of Congress hope to influence one another. The evidence demonstrates that – even on a highly salient issue such as NAFTA – the informative signals of other legislators are sometimes paramount to the preferences of a legislator's constituency.