Profile of Philip N. Johnson-Laird.

نویسنده

  • Farooq Ahmed
چکیده

O ur greatest technological accomplishments, from space travel to nuclear power and the creation of the Internet, stand as testaments to the scientific process and mankind’s ability to reason. These advances, however, have been matched with equally spectacular technological catastrophes. “Scientists and technologists are rational in principle,” explains Philip Johnson-Laird, a professor of psychology at Princeton University and recently elected member of the National Academy of Sciences. “But the more information they have to take into account, the more working memory they need and the longer time it takes them to make an inference.” When complex technology starts spiraling out of hand, this abundance of information hinders our ability to make reliable decisions. “Eventually,” Johnson-Laird says, “the computational demands overwhelm them, and this often culminates in catastrophes.” Johnson-Laird has been studying the human ability to reason for nearly a half a century. His theory of mental models, which outlines how real or imaginary situations are represented in the brain, has challenged long-held assumptions about how humans think. “Mental model theory implies that we are rational because we grasp that an inference is no good if we can think of a counterexample to it,” he says. “In practice, however, we often err, failing to find, search for, or heed a counterexample.”

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Strategies in temporal reasoning

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or

متن کامل

The Probability of Conditionals

We report two studies investigating how naïve reasoners evaluate the probability that a conditional assertion is true, and the conditional probability that the consequent of the conditional is true given that the antecedent is true. The mental model theory predicts that individuals should evaluate the probability of a conditional on the basis of the mental models representing the conditional, a...

متن کامل

Modal reasoning , models , and Manktelow and Over Philip

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J., 1992. Modal reasoning, models. and Manktelow and Over. Cognition, 43. 173-182. Manktelow and Over (1991) argue that their studies of Wason’s selection task favor explanations of deontic reasoning based on mental models, but that such theories need to incorporate utilities. This theoretical note proposes a simpler explanation of the phenomena: subjects in ...

متن کامل

The Psychology of Syllogisms

Two experiments were carried out in which subjects had to draw conclusions from syllogistic premises. The nature of their responses showed that the figure of the syllogisms exerted a strong effect on the accuracy of performance and on the nature of the conclusions that were drawn. For example, premises such as “Some of the parents are scientists; All of the scientists are drivers” tend to elici...

متن کامل

Reasoning from Suppositions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

دوره 108 50  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011