Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at
نویسنده
چکیده
We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a substantial fraction of the value through gradual revelation, and how the entire value can be extracted with the help of a mediator.
منابع مشابه
The Origin and Limitations of Modern Mathematical Economics: A Historical Approach
We have first demonstrated that Debreu’s view regarding the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 as the birth of modern mathematical economics is not convincing. In this paper, we have proposed the hypothesis that the coordinated research programs in the 1930’s, initiated by the Econometric Society and the Cowles Commission for Research...
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