Strategyproof Mechanisms towards Dynamic Topology Formation in Autonomous Networks

In autonomous networks, cooperations among nodes cannot be assumed, since each node is capable of making independent decisions based on their personal preferences. In particular, when a node needs the help of intermediate nodes to relay messages to other nodes, these intermediaries may be reluctant to contribute their network resource for the benefit of others. Ideally, the right amount of incentives should be provided to motivate cooperations among autonomous nodes so that a mutually beneficial network results. In this paper, we leverage the power of mechanism design in microeconomics to design a distributed incentive mechanism that motivates each node towards a more desirable network topology. Since network parameters and constraints change dynamically in reality, the desirable topology can vary over time. Our solution presented in this paper has successfully encompassed such a dynamic nature of the network topology. In addition, we have transformed our solution to an easy-to-implement distributed algorithm, that converges towards the globally optimal topology.