Identifying and Testing Generalized Moral Hazard Models of Managerial Compensation
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper seeks to answer two questions about executive compensation. How important is hidden information relative to moral hazard, and how biased are empirical measures of moral hazard in econometric models that do not account for hidden information? An analytical stage of this paper exploit restrictions from the theory of optimal contracting to identify hidden information and di¤erentiate its e¤ects from moral hazard. An empirical stage uses and develops nonparametric and numerical methods to quantify the importance of the various factors identi ed in the rst stage using a large longitudinal data set on chief executive o¢ cers.
منابع مشابه
Identifying and Testing Models of Managerial Compensation
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