Carlos Alós - Ferrer

Carlos Alós - Ferrer Georg Kirchsteiger Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions ?

This paper analyzes the question of whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, ...

Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

This paper considers bound

Working Papers Department of Economics University of Vienna

Behavioural Public Economics : Extended

Alós-Ferrer and Granić (2012) present results from two *eld experiments on electoral reform, which were carried out alongside o-cial state and federal elections in Germany, in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Electors who had voted in the o-cial elections, which used the mixed-member proportional representation (MMPR) system, were given the opportunity to vote in an experimental election using the ...

Robustness of perfectly competitive equilibria to memory in imitative learning

We extend the analysis in Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005) to allow for memory in the imitative learning process. Adding memory allows to detect and correct unprofitable deviations and makes it harder to disturb Nash equilibria with spiteful deviations that achieve a relative advantage. We show for the case of general aggregative submodular games that perfectly competitive outcomes are still stochas...