On the stable b-matching polytope
نویسنده
چکیده
We characterize the bipartite stable b-matching polytope in terms of linear constraints. The stable b-matching polytope is the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of stable b-matchings, that is, of stable assignments of a two-sided multiple partner matching model. Our proof uses the comparability theorem of Roth and Sotomayor [13] and follows a similar line as Rothblum did in [14] for the stable matching polytope.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 46 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003