Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example.
منابع مشابه
Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
Service Oriented Enterprises (SOEs) are subject to constant change and variation. In this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. Once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. We construct a game theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflicting i...
متن کاملA Model of Endogenous Government Formation
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Non-cooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a g...
متن کاملStructure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. In this paper, we apply the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model to a specific negotiation process, involv...
متن کاملBargaining in a Three-Agent CoalitionS Game: An Application of Genetic Programming
We are conducting a series of investigations whose primary objective is to demonstrate that boundedly rational agents, operating with fairly elementary computational mechanisms, can adapt to achieve approximately optimal strategies for bargaining with other agents in complex and dynamic environments of multilateral negotiations that humans find challenging. In this paper, we present results fro...
متن کاملVoting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments1
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties’ minimal integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all p...
متن کامل