Control in Judgment Aggregation 1
نویسندگان
چکیده
In computational social choice, the complexity of changing the outcome of elections via various control actions, such as adding or deleting candidates or voters, has been studied intensely. We introduce the concept of control for judgment aggregation procedures, and study the complexity of changing the outcome of such procedures via control by adding, deleting, or replacing judges.
منابع مشابه
Computational Aspects of Manipulation and Control in Judgment Aggregation
We study computational aspects of various forms of manipulation and control in judgment aggregation, with a focus on the premise-based procedure. For manipulation, we in particular consider incomplete judgment sets and the notions of top-respecting and closeness-respecting preferences introduced by Dietrich and List [DL07]. This complements previous work on the complexity of manipulation in jud...
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