Non-Exploitable Protocols for Repeated Cake Cutting
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce the notion of exploitability in cut-and-choose protocols for repeated cake cutting. If a cut-and-choose protocol is repeated, the cutter can possibly gain information about the chooser from her previous actions, and exploit this information for her own gain, at the expense of the chooser. We define a generalization of cut-and-choose protocols—forced-cut protocols—in which some cuts are made exogenously while others are made by the cutter, and show that there exist nonexploitable forced-cut protocols that use a small number of cuts per day: When the cake has at least as many dimensions as days, we show a protocol that uses a single cut per day. When the cake is 1-dimensional, we show an adaptive non-exploitable protocol that uses 3 cuts per day, and a nonadaptive protocol that uses n cuts per day (where n is the number of days). In contrast, we show that no non-adaptive non-exploitable forced-cut protocol can use a constant number of cuts per day. Finally, we show that if the cake is at least 2-dimensional, there is a non-adaptive non-exploitable protocol that uses 3 cuts per day.
منابع مشابه
Meta-envy-free Cake-cutting and Pie-cutting Protocols
This paper discusses cake-cutting protocols when the cake is a heterogeneous good, represented by an interval on the real line. We propose a new desirable property, the meta-envy-freeness of cake-cutting, which has not been formally considered before. Meta-envy-free means there is no envy on role assignments, that is, no party wants to exchange his/her role in the protocol with the one of any o...
متن کاملMeta-Envy-Free Cake-Cutting Protocols
This paper discusses cake-cutting protocols when the cake is a heterogeneous good that is represented by an interval in the real line. We propose a new desirable property, the meta-envy-freeness of cake-cutting, which has not been formally considered before. Though envy-freeness was considered to be one of the most important desirable properties, envy-freeness does not prevent envy about role a...
متن کاملA Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting
We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol for two agents in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. For n > 2 agents, a similar impossibility holds, namely there always exis...
متن کاملDegrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols
Fair allocation of goods or resources among various agents is a central task in multiagent systems and other fields. The specific setting where just one divisible resource is to be divided fairly is commonly referred to as cake cutting, and agents are called players in this setting. Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a cake and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way th...
متن کاملEquilibria of Generalized Cut and Choose Protocols
Classic cake cutting protocols — which fairly allocate a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences — are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic outcomes still guarantee fairness? We model the interaction among agents as a game and study its Nash equilibria. We show that each protocol in the novel class of generalized cut and choose protocols — which includes the most i...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017