Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings
نویسندگان
چکیده
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be ``single'' in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: J41. 2000 Academic Press
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 91 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000