Incentive Compatible Mechanism Based on Linear Pricing Scheme for Single-Minded Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we study incentive compatible mechanism based on linear pricing scheme for single-minded auction, a restricted case of combinatorial auction, in which each buyer desires a unique fixed bundle of various commodities, improving the previous works [1, 11, 13] on pricing bundles (i.e., payments of buyers).
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