Bargaining with Middlemen
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we consider a dynamic and decentralized market modeled by a noncooperative networked bargaining game. Our goal is to study how the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the market’s efficiency and fairness. We introduce the concept of limit stationary equilibrium in a general trading network and use it to analyze how endogenous delay emerges in trade and how surplus is shared between sellers and buyers.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1302.2869 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013