Information, Decisions and Incentives
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper we endogenize the point in time where an agent (and the principal) observe the realization of an additional signal: before the agent’s effort choice (ex ante information) or after (ex post information). We show that there is no difference between incentive and decision problems if the signal is uninformative about the agent’s effort: ex ante information is never worse and – if there are gains from tailoring effort to the new information – strictly better than ex post information. If output is informative and there are no gains from tailoring, ex ante information does strictly worse.
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