Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects – objects with proper parts – do not exist. Nihilists generally paraphrase talk of composite objects F into talk of there being “x s arranged F-wise” (for example, while nihilists deny that there are tables, they concede that there are “x s arranged table-wise”). Recently several philosophers have argued that nihilism is defective insofar as nihilists are either unable to say what they mean by such phrases as “there are x s arranged F-wise,” or that nihilists are unable to employ such phrases without incurring significant costs, perhaps even undermining one of the chief motivations for nihilism. In this paper I defend nihilism against these objections. A key theme of the paper is this: if nihilists need to employ such phrases as “there are x s arranged F-wise,” non-nihilists will need to do so as well. Accordingly, any costs incurred by the nihilist when she employs such phrases will be shared by everyone else.