Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
نویسنده
چکیده
Article history: Received 8 January 2011 Available online 28 January 2012 JEL classification: C78 D61 D63 I20
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 75 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012