Generalizing Jeffrey Conditionalization
نویسنده
چکیده
Jeffrey's rule has been generalized by Wagner to the case in which new evidence bounds the possible revisions of a prior probability below by a Dempsterian lower probability. Classical probability kinematics arises within this gen eralization as the special case in which the evidentiary focal elements of the bounding lower probability are pairwise disjoint. We discuss a twofold extension of this general ization, first allowing the lower bound to be any two-monotone capacity and then allow ing the prior to be a lower envelope.
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