The Effective Indexical

In a famous paper in Noûs in , John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs. In addition to “third-person” information about her environment, an agent need “first-person” information about where, when and who she is. This conclusion is widely interpreted as a reason for thinking that tensed claims cannot be translated without loss into untensed language; but not as a reason for realism about tensed facts. In another famous paper in the same volume of Noûs, Nancy Cartwright argues that action requires that agents represent their world in causal terms, rather than merely probabilistic terms: for, Cartwright argues, there’s a distinction between effective and ineffective strategies, that otherwise goes missing. This is widely taken as a reason for thinking that causal claims cannot be translated without loss into merely probabilistic claims; and also – in contrast to Perry’s case – widely regarded as a reason for realism about causation. In this paper I ask whether the latter conclusion is compulsory, or whether, as in Perry’s case, the need for causal beliefs might merely reflect some “situated” aspect of a decision-maker’s perspective.  Two bits of Noûs from  In his well-known paper ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’ – the first article in Vol.  of Noûs in  – John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs. In addition to “impersonal” or “third-personal” information about her environment, an agent need “situated” or “first-personal” information – information about the “I, here and now” of her situation. If she wants to get to a meeting, and believes that it starts at :pm, it takes the belief that it is now :pm to get her moving. Perry, J. . ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs , –.