Stable Matching with Uncertain Pairwise Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
Haris Aziz Data61, CSIRO and UNSW Sydney, Australia [email protected] Péter Biró Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary [email protected] Tamás Fleiner Loránd Eötvös University Budapest, Hungary [email protected] Serge Gaspers Data61, CSIRO and UNSW Sydney, Australia [email protected] Ronald de Haan Technische Universität Wien Vienna, Austria [email protected] Nicholas Mattei IBM Research New York, USA [email protected] Baharak Rastegari University of Glasgow Glasgow, UK [email protected]
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