Generating Bayes-Nash Equilibria to Design Autonomous Trading Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper presents a methodology for designing trading agents for complex games. We compute, for the first time, Bayes-Nash equilibria for firstprice single-unit auctions and m-price multi-unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. To evaluate this approach we used our analysis to generate strategies for the International Trading Agent Competition. One of these was evaluated as the best overall and was subsequently used very successfully by our agent WhiteBear in the 2005 competition.
منابع مشابه
Using Equilibria to Handle Design Tradeoffs of Autonomous Trading Agents
In previous work we presented a methodology for designing a trading agent when several tradeoffs are present. In this paper we expand this methodology to include design decisions based on Bayes-Nash equilibria that we compute for subproblems of the original problem. In particular we compute Bayes-Nash equilibria for first price single unit auctions and m price multi unit auctions, when the auct...
متن کاملImproving on Strategy-proof School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation
While much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness, recent research has aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non-truthtelling equilibria. We address two issues that arise from this approach. We first show that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition, agents fail to reach non-truthtelling equilibria. We offer another way forward: im...
متن کاملCooperative Task-Processing Networks: Parallel Computation of Non-trivial Volunteering Equilibria
This work gives the complete details of a novel framework for the analysis and design of distributed agents that must complete externally generated tasks but also can volunteer to process tasks encountered by other agents. A distributed asynchronous volunteering policy is presented that dynamically adjusts task flow around the network of agents. It is shown that even though agents independently...
متن کاملLocal Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
This paper presents a model of local network effects in which agents connected in a social network each value the adoption of a product by a heterogeneous subset of other agents in their neighborhood, and have incomplete information about the structure and strength of adoption complementarities between all other agents. I show that the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of this network game are in...
متن کاملEmpirical analysis of plurality election equilibria
Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on manipulation of voting methods studies (1) limited solution concepts, (2) limited preferences, or (3) scenarios with a few manipulators that have a common goal. In contrast, we study voting in plurality elections thr...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007