Self-deception and the Logic of Belief
نویسنده
چکیده
The point of departure for this presentation is the brief discussion of self-deception that appears in Hintikka’s book Knowledge and Belief – An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Cornell UP, 1962. Hintikka starts from a remark by Montaigne: “Some make the world believe that they believe what they do not believe; others, in greater number, make themselves believe it”, and gives a formal treatment of (the second part of) Montaigne’s remark that parallels Hintikka’s analysis of Moore’s puzzle about saying and disbelieving. Those analyses depend crucially on the 4. schema for the logic of belief (later dubbed the ‘positive introspection schema’): Bap → BaBap
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