Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport Citation

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [4], as long as each bidder’s type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it was recently shown that exact revenue optimization is intractable, even when there is only one bidder [8]. Even for item distributions with special structure, optimal mechanisms have been surprisingly rare [13] and the problem is challenging even in the two-item case [10]. In this paper, we provide a framework for designing optimal mechanisms using optimal transport theory and duality theory. We instantiate our framework to obtain conditions under which only pricing the grand bundle is optimal in multi-item settings (complementing the work of [13]), as well as to characterize optimal two-item mechanisms. We use our results to derive closed-form descriptions of the optimal mechanism in several two-item settings, exhibiting also a setting where a continuum of lotteries is necessary for revenue optimization but a closed-form representation of the mechanism can still be found efficiently using our framework. Supported by a Sloan Foundation Fellowship, a Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship, and NSF Award CCF0953960 (CAREER) and CCF-1101491. Supported by Fannie and John Hertz Foundation Daniel Stroock Fellowship and NSF Award CCF-1101491. Supported by NSF Award CCF1101491.