The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism

A cross the broad fields of educational theory and research, constructivism has become something akin to a secular religion. In her book Evolution as a Religion (1985), Mary Midgley wrote that the theory of evolution "is not just an inert piece of theoretical science. It is, and cannot help being, also a powerful folk-tale about human origins. Any such narrative must have symbolic force" (1985, p. 1). She might well have written the same about constructivism, which is, whatever else it may be, a "powerful folktale" about the origins of human knowledge. As in all living religions, constructivism has many sects--each of which harbors some distrust of its rivals. This descent into sectarianism, and the accompanying growth in distrust of nonbelievers, is probably the fate of all large-scale movements inspired by interesting ideas; and it is the ideological or ugly side of the present scene, which is reflected in my article's title. The educational literature on constructivism is enormous, and growing rapidly; a significant indicator is that the 1993 AERA Annual Meeting Program contained more than a score of sessions explicitly on this topic. Even as interesting a symposium as that which recently appeared in the Educational Researcher (vol. 23, 7, 1994) was able to give only an inadequate hint of the many varieties of constructivism that presently exist. It is part of my purpose in this essay to complicate matters even more by pointing to relevant discussions in other literatures that are rarely, if ever, mentioned by those embroiled in the educational debates. In particular, I will try to show that in the fields of epistemology and philosophy of science, in the relatively young discipline of science studies (an interdisciplinary philosophical, sociological, and historical field), and in the rapidly burgeoning feminist literature, there is much of relevance and interest to be found. The term constructivism does not occur with great frequency in these other bodies of l i terature--for example, the recent encyclopedic volume edited by Dancy and Sosa (1992), A Companion to Epistemology, gives it only three passing references--but nevertheless closely related ideas are the subject of vigorous debate. To compensate for introducing these new complexities, however, I also will offer a way of viewing the various forms of constructivism that, I claim, will produce some order and clarity--I will argue that the main constructivist writers can be located along each of three different dimensions or axes, and this highlights the relationships and differences between them. Given the volume of literature, to make good even on this promise is such a daunting task that almost all of my discussion will have to remain descriptive and clarificatory in orientation--to venture into criticisms (of which, I must admit, I have a number that I regard as quite serious) would require more space than even a tolerant editor of ER can make available. Besides which, informed critique must be based on a clear understanding of the position (or range of positions) being examined, and it is this necessary and preliminary task that will occupy me in the present article. My critical and evaluative discussion will be held over to a longer work that is in preparation. 1 None of this, however, should be interpreted as meaning that I find all constructivist views unattractive--I hold that there is a very broad and loose sense in Which all of us these days are constructivists, but, as usual, "God is in the details." To turn, then, to the descriptive task in hand: The rampant sectarianism, coupled with the array of other literatures that contain pertinent material, makes it difficult to give even a cursory introductory account of constructivism, for members of the various sects will object that their own views are nothing like this! But to get the discussion underway, this oversimple gloss should convey the general idea (a more precise account of the issues at stake shall emerge as the discussion progresses): These days we do not believe that individuals come into the world with their "cognitive data banks" already prestocked with empirical knowledge, or with pre-embedded epistemological criteria or methodological rules. Nor do we believe that most of our knowledge is acquired, readyformed, by some sort of direct perception or absorption. Undoubtedly humans are born with some cognitive or epistemological equipment or potentialities (the nature and degree of which the experts in developmental psychology still dispute--witness, for example, the well-known argument between Piaget and Chomsky about innateness and genetic programming), but by and large human knowledge, and the criteria and methods we use in our inquiries, are all constructed. Furthermore, the bodies of knowledge available to the growing learner are themselves human constructs--physics, biology, sociology, and even philosophy are not disciplines the content of which was handed down, ready formed, from on high; scholars have labored mightily over the generations to construct the content of these fields, and no doubt "internal politics" has played some role. Thus, in sum, human knowledge--whether it be the bodies of public knowledge known as the various disciplines, or the cognitive structures of individual knowers or learners--is constructed. And here, then, is the source of an initial confusion: Some constructivist sects focus their