Truth Value Intervals, Bets, and Dialogue Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Fuzzy logics in Zadeh’s ‘narrow sense’ (Zadeh, 1988), i.e., truth functional logics referring to the real closed unit interval [0,1] as set of truth values, are often motivated as logics for ‘reasoning with imprecise notions and propositions’ (see, e.g., (Hájek, 1998)). However the relation between these logics and theories of vagueness, as discussed in a prolific discourse in analytic philosophy (Keefe & Rosanna, 2000), (Keefe & Smith, 1987), (Shapiro, 2006) is highly contentious. We will not directly engage in this debate here but rather pick out so-called interval based fuzzy logics as an instructive example to study
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