Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
نویسنده
چکیده
Article history: Received 13 February 2010 Available online 1 June 2012 JEL classification: C72 D83
منابع مشابه
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Working Paper Department of Economics Self -confirming Equilibrium
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 76 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012