Internet Appendix for "Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals"
نویسنده
چکیده
Proof of Lemma A.1: The shareholders bene t from voting for the proposal depends on his beliefs about the state of the world. Since !g > !b, other shareholders votes are informative about their signals and could be used to update the shareholders beliefs. However, when voting, the shareholder does not observe the votes of other shareholders and therefore has to consider N possible situations, corresponding to the number of a¢ rmative votes among the other N 1 shareholders, TN 1, being 0; 1; ::: or N 1. Let us denote by (TN 1) the shareholders expected utility from voting "for" relative to his expected utility from voting "against," given TN 1 a¢ rmative votes among other shareholders and his own signal s. Then the shareholders expected bene t from voting for the proposal relative to voting against the proposal, !;T (s), is given by
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