Economic Resources, Marital Bargains, and Marital Quality

Under what conditions do spouses have more “voice” or bargaining power to get what they want from their marriages? The objective of this research project is to explore how spouses’ economic resources affect marital bargains and outcomes. The main hypothesis is that spouses with more resources are able to strike bargains about marital roles that they perceive to be more fair and that lead to more satisfying marriages. In this analysis, we use longitudinal data from 3 waves of the NSFH to assess whether changes in a wife’s relative earnings, amount of and perceptions of fairness of housework, and marital conflict are associated with changes in marital quality. Because of the omnipresent effects of gender on individual identities, interactions, institutions, and societal norms, we examine variation by gender in the relationship among changes in resources, amount of and perceived fairness of housework, marital conflict, and changes in marital quality. We find that equity perceptions and change in conflict level are stronger predictors of marital happiness and feelings that one would be better off divorced, compared with relative earnings and absolute amounts of paid work and housework. Wives’ and husbands’ who perceive that household chores and working for pay are unfair to them are less likely to think that the marriage is very happy and more likely to think they would be better off divorced than remaining married. Higher marital conflict also decreases marital happiness and increases wives’ and husbands’ feelings that they would be better off divorced. Results in suggest that wives are not able to use greater economic resources to negotiate better marital bargains; instead higher economic resources may be inclining them towards exercising an exit