STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION: JAPANESE AUTO MAKERS IN THE UNITED STATES. by

Automobile dealers in the United States face severe structural changes. Consolidation is occurring as superstores and mall outlets increase in numbers. Publicly traded companies buy up independent dealers and establish chains of stores. The Internet is emerging as a major channel for model comparison and dealer choice. Against this background the present study assesses the likely impact on Japanese auto makers' competitiveness in the American marketplace. The paper first investigates the role of dealer relations in the success of the Japanese auto makers, and then proceeds to a description based on secondary data on how U.S. auto distribution is changing. The paper ends with an analysis of the changes in car buying behavior and the likely impact on the Japanese automakers. INTRODUCTION The Japanese manufacturers' success in the U.S. auto market in the 1970s and 1980s has been well documented. In the 1990s the challenges from domestic and European cars have been stronger, but the Japanese have persevered despite facing a severely weakened home market. After the Ford Taurus took top honor as the best-selling model in 1996, the Toyota Camry was the leader in 1997, and the new Honda Accord is on track to win the 1998 race. The role of the dealer network in this success story is less well documented. However, there seems to be no doubt about the fact that the Japanese insistence on a well trained and strongly supported (but independent) dealer force has played a positive role. Writers analyzing the successes during the oil crises of the 1970s point to the steadily increasing coverage and penetration of the Japanese makes' dealer networks during this period. For example, in a 1980 study at the University of Michigan, James Rader reaches a general conclusion about the Japanese manufacturers' advantages in the U.S. market: "On the average, the Japanese firms have increased their number of models, number of products/markets entered, and number of dealers far in excess of corresponding German efforts along the same line..." (Rader, 1980). Similarly, in an econometric study of the Japanese versus the American auto makers in the same decade, Johansson and Van den Abeele (1998) find that the number of dealers influenced the market shares very significantly (although they caution that there could be a two-way relationship at work, dealer increases as a company response to share increases). When entering the U.S. market at the end of the 150s, Toyota and Nissan relied on dualing with existing car dealers to speed up the expansion and limit the financial exposure. Soon, however, as sales took off, new single-make dealerships were established. While 2 Mitsubishi allied itself with Chrysler and Mazda soon became coupled with Ford, Honda has been developing its own dealer network from the start. After rejecting the weak U.S. dealer structure for motorcycles, new dealers were recruited, a practice which was also followed when in the 1970s the automobiles and later the Acura brand were introduced. The actual number of U.S. dealers for the Japanese auto makers in selected years is shown in Exhibit 1. ____________________ Exhibit 1 about here ____________________ As can be seen, by the end of the 1970s, the numbers stabilized, as the market was basically penetrated at a level of sales dollar per dealer which allowed the dealer sufficient revenues. By contrast, Ford, Chevrolet and Volkswagan continued to reduce the number of dealers in line with shrinking market shares to get the revenues per dealer down to a more sustainable level. Toyota, Nissan, and Honda also introduced many qualitative changes in the way dealerships are managed. Customer service quality was improved drastically through extensive technical training programs for service and repair. The salesperson's interaction with the customer was enhanced through extensive product information and personal service training. Toyota's video training tapes with actors and real-life dealers acting out sales situations became quite notorious for teaching the dealers the company style. Sales facilities, conveniences and store atmospherics were improved with simple changes such as providing comfortable chairs and carpets in showrooms, clean restrooms, and refreshments. Customer satisfaction with dealers became standard procedure. 3 As perhaps the most important change, the relationship between dealers and manufacturer was changed from one of conflict and zero-sum thinking to one of supportive and win-win sentiment. This change was brought about by much more open and direct exchange between car manufacturers and their dealers. Especially in the beginning when the number of dealers was still relatively small, it was not uncommon for the Japanese managers at the U.S. headquarters to travel around the country and visit the dealers sometime during the year. These visits can be powerful motivational tools and control mechanisms. As Johansson & Nonaka say: "They are of course team builders and motivators. 'In Japan we call them whisky management tools,' says Kiyonori Sakakibara, a mangement professor from Tokyo. But the visits are also occasions for hardheaded problem solving. 'I find that out of ten complaints, five can be settled directly, three are based on misunderstandings, and only two remain for any lengthy discussions,' claims Isao Makino, head of Toyota North America in the 1980s." (Johansson & Nonaka, 1996, p.154). Of course, with benchmarking techniques, TQM, and customer satisfaction throughly diffused during the late 1980s and the 1990s, the Japanese advantages in dealer training and customer care may well have been erased. In fact, in a comment on the MOSS 1994 report on Japanese auto distribution, Toyota's dealer support in the U.S. is said to be lower than that of the Big Three. While only three types of specialists call on Toyota dealers (finance/accounting, marketing, and service), the Big Three regional or zone offices will send as many as twenty types of specialists to assist their American dealers (AIADA, 1994). With the competitive climate a heated as ever in the U.S. auto market, and with the new resurgence of the Europeans, it is hard to say with certainty what role dealer differences may play 4 in consumer choice -or whether there are many significant differences anymore. In any case, these questions may be moot given the vast structural changes in distribution structure at work today, affecting all auto dealers in fundamental ways. THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES The last two or three years have seen dramatic change in the way automobiles are bought and sold in the United States. Roughly speaking there are three dimensions to this structural change. One relates to the growth of superstores and auto malls which offer buyers much larger selections than before. A second involves the emergence of a few large operators taking over several existing dealerships by offering stock in a publicly traded parent company. A third aspect is the creation of a separate market place on the Internet, where comparison shopping can be done via a computer terminal and dealers' Web-sites can be accessed for price information. Superstores and auto malls. Although technically different, superstores and auto malls represent similar changes since they encourage one-stop shopping by the consumer. Superstores are large one-dealer outlets with large selection, especially of used cars, usually several makes, low sales pressure and often fixed and non-negotiable prices. Although for the consumer superstores may seem to suggest discounted prices, such is not necessarily the case. Auto malls are collections of independent dealerships located close together usually in strip malls. Although one dealer may have more than one dealership in the mall, the dealers are typically independently owned. 5 According to J.D.Power and Associates, these forms of auto retailing have exhibited explosive growth in recent years. In California, for example, the mall outlets accounted for about 40% of total 1997 sales of new cars and trucks. However, the penetration is uneven geographically, and the total figure for the U.S. was 9% of 1997 sales, in about 200 malls. The J.D.Power research also shows that the one-stop shopping experience offered by auto malls and superstores provides a synergy which buyers find very attractive. The conclusion is that these forms of retailing "are here to stay" (J.D.Power and Associates, 1997a). Superstores and auto malls can be strong competitors, although so far the superstores have been focusing on used cars while auto malls are stronger for new cars. This can change with the ownership consolidation that is underway, fueled by the handful of publicly traded companies which are buying up independent dealerships. Public ownership. While the emergence of superstores and auto malls seems in line with similar changes in many retailing channels long ago, the emergence of public ownership of dealers is a more dramatic change. The traditional dealer franchising agreement is struck between the manufacturer and an independent business person. In the past, manufacturers have stayed out of dealer ownerships, and dealers have typically been private owners (although a dealer may own more than one dealership for a make, and also "dual" with one or more complementary makes). Public ownership of a dealership has been traditionally been frowned upon by manufacturers, and in many franchising contracts public ownership above a certain percentage is expressly prohibited. The reason has been the perceived need for owner involvement in 6 management of a franchise, but also the relative balance of power between dealer and manufacturer. From a marketing perspective, these reasons appear eminently justified, since marketing knowhow needs to be transmitted and marketing support given by the manufacturer to the franchisee. Recent years have seen a challenge to this system. Most conspicuous perhaps has been the arrival of Republic Industries, Wayne Huizenga's holding company listed on the New York stock exchange. Having sold his Florida baseball team and the Blockbuster chain of video rental stores, Huizenga has turned his eyes towards investing in automobile dealerships. The takeover strategy mirrors that of other publicly traded companies. Against stocks in his company, Huizenga buys the independent dealerships whose owners are looking to get out of a changing industry. In 1996-97, spending $700 million for 15 dealerships covering several states but concentrated mainly in the Southeastern U.S., Republic quickly became the leading auto network in America (Nikkei, 1997). Antitrust restrictions prohibit all local dealerships for one make to be consolidated under one owner, but the market area defining "local" is still to be determined. It is perhaps understandable if the entry of publicly traded companies into dealer ownership has been resisted by the Japanese companies especially. As we have seen, the Japanese focus on establishing stronger ties with their U.S. dealers than was customary before their entry. Consequently, Toyota, Nissan and Honda have all challenged Republic in court, trying to stop the takeovers. Characteristically, they were joined by Saturn, the GM division which have made customer and service commitment a salient feature of its appeal. However, by July 1998 all except Nissan had reached a settlement with Republic which allows the takeovers to be completed. The Honda settlement allows Republic to add 10 Honda and one Acura dealership 7 (Wernie, 1998). As part of the settlement, Honda is likely to change its standing policy that no more than 50% of a dealership can be publicly owned. So publicly owned dealerships and nation-wide dealer chains are coming. Apart from Republic's AutoNation, there is now also Driver's Mart, CarMax and the United Auto Group. In response, some independent dealers are expanding as well. Hendrick Automotive Group, privately owned in Charlotte, N.C., owns 67 new car dealerships representing 28 car brands (Evanoff, 1997). And the consolidation continues. The Thomason Auto Group in Portland, OR., operates 9 new-car and 12 used-car dealerships, but is selling out to the Philadelphia-based Asbury Automotive Group, which will become one of the three largest U.S. auto dealers (Brown, 1998). These privately based groups gain some of the same scale advantages of the publicly listed groups. And they know the business better. A 1997 J.D.Power report on dealer reactions suggests that the only advantage for the listed companies might be their better access to large amounts of capital. A good 25% of the dealers interviewed thought that Republic and CarMax's costs will be too high, both in inventory and acquisition. And then there is the uncertainty involved in share prices: "Declining stock prices and uncertainty of Republic, Driver's Mart, and CarMax's longterm commitment to the automotive industry, has made dealers very wary of selling to them for stock," according to Mr. Brian Walters, senior analyst at J.D.Power and Associates (J.D.Power and Associates, 1997b). One can also add to this the question of how buyers of automobiles will react. Buying a car is the largest investment after a home (and possibly children's education) that an individual 8 household makes. It is not clear whether a publicly held dealership can offer a similar level of trust and commitment to a customer that a private franchise owner can credibly project. But with free market capitalism doing very well by many American consumers, such doubts might not be very salient. The Internet. The most conspicuous recent change in the U.S. distribution of automobiles is undoubtedly the emergence of the Internet as a major channel. In the last few years several online buying services have been established, including Auto-By-Tel, AutoVantage, and CarMart. With the increased penetration in U.S. homes and workplaces -Business Week (5/97) estimates about 40 million users -the Internet has become an important and influential resource tool in the car-buying process. According to research on Home PC subscribers, 84% of Internet users say they intend to use the Web to find information about automobiles. J.D.Power estimates that in 1997 an estimated 16% of new-car and new-truck buyers used the Internet as part of their shopping process. Accessing the market place of an on-line service, the Internet shopper is offered a wide range of makes and models. Clicking on a specific model, the potential buyer can access information about product specification and pictures, options, and list prices. Interestingly, research shows that the number of "hits" per car model -a typical measure of user interest -is roughly proportional to the model's market share. One might have expected that the ease of access would have tempted the users to explore more obscure models. 9 The user can also find the full text of various test reports, and can identify the dealer cost, and thus the dealer markup. Icons to get to the manufacturers own website are displayed. Dealers are also listed, by geographical location, and the user can access their sites to get information about model availability and prices. The user can contact a dealer on-line, or simply record a telephone number and call later. The on-line car shopping services in fact offer a complete and functioning market place. The cost of its operation is covered by manufacturer and dealer fees for participation. With the explosive growth of the Internet, and the attractiveness of the sales leads, few manufacturers of dealers can afford not to join. The typical Internet user is better educated and has a higher income than average. According to the Business Week 1997 study, 54% have completed college and more, 42% earn more than $50,000 annually, the average age is 33 years, and 58% are male. These are impressive numbers in particular for up-scale automobiles. Typically, while 18% of all Honda dealers had Web-sites in 1997, all 263 Acura dealers had sites. The manufacturers help the dealers develop their Web-sites, drawing on their own Web-sites and experience. According to a 1998 J.D.Power study among dealers with Web-sites, experiences with online services are generally positive. Even though the typical Internet shopper has more information about prices and therefore tends to strike a harder bargain, the Internet reach allows the dealer to access a larger territory. On-line marketing is also cost effective when compared to other forms of dealer advertising, such as newspaper, radio and television. The average dealership's marketing cost per vehicle sold through on-line buying services is only 61% of the average cost of traditional advertising media. In addition, the current fee structure of on-line buying services allows even larger cost efficiencies as a dealer's on-line sales volume increases. 10 For example, dealers selling more than 12 vehicles on-line per month spend an average of only 23% of average cost of traditional advertising (J.D.Power and Associates, 1998a). The same study also found that dealer computer skills are not important, but customer handling skills are. Even the Internet customer requires prompt and attentive service, and good interpersonal skills are still important. Technology apparently does not eliminate personal feelings. In the end, the growth of on-line car buying services has probably helped some of the smaller independent dealers, while simultaneously posing a threat to superstores and auto malls. The on-line market place can in fact be seen as a substitute for the one-stop shopping made possible by the superstores and the malls. And in the on-line market, even a smaller dealer can score. The Internet user might as easily access a smaller dealer as a larger one -as research shows, lower price is what people look for when it comes to dealer choice. As we have seen there are probably scale advantages for a large dealer in setting up and operating a Web-site, but even smaller dealers can do this with the help of the manufacturer. IMPLICATIONS One inference to be drawn from the preceding empirical material is that the competitive advantage that the Japanese auto makers might have had in their U.S. dealer service is no longer sustained. Benchmarking of best practices, marketing support and upgrading of after-sale service by U.S. and foreign manufacturers have helped them rise to competitive parity. 11 Quality and service Once the quality circles, the Baldrige quality award learning, and TQM initiatives had permeated most auto manufacturers, product quality was no longer a clear Japanese advantage, especially vis-a-vis the upscale German cars. By 1989, product quality was no longer the overriding concern it had been earlier, and with fuel prices low-to-reasonable, mileage was no longer an issue. Furthermore, with computer design technology, aerodynamics, engine technology, electronics and ABS well diffused in the industry, design and styling differences became less marked. Even if the rate of new model introductions was speeded up because of competitive pressures, quality and design were simply more comparable. With cars looking and feeling alike, customer care and satisfaction briefly became new differentiators. This apparently did not last long, however. Within a few years benchmarking and pressure from market research firms intent on offering a new "product" made customer satisfaction measurement and best service practices (loaner cars, personalized treatment) standard in the industry. Saturn is not the only case in point. The greater effort documented by AIADA among the Big three auto manufacturers is evidence of their desire to catch up with the Japanese and European service levels. With the economy booming, in the last few years the U.S. auto buyer has shifted back to new features and value added: Larger, comfortable cars, sports utility vehicles, new gadgets such as orientation maps and talking controls, and status. Not surprisingly, the role of brand image and identity has taken on new importance as well. J.D. Power is probably correct, that customer care -how the customers can be entertained and productive while waiting for service -is where the competitive battle is now carried on. Car ownership is today even more an expression of who you are, rather than where you want to go. 12 A sign of how the U.S. auto market is mature and saturated is that much of the advertising emphasizes that "you have arrived." There is little need to go any further. Be that as it may, the competitive advantage of the Japanese (or any other manufacturer) in the U.S. auto market is no longer on the dealer side. The restructuring going on in the dealer network has seen to that. The consolidations, and the public ownership of the dealerships, coupled with the emergence of Internet shopping makes dealer identity anonymous, erases differentiation among dealerships for different makes (although not necessarily between dealer chains), and threaten to make the dealer mainly a price broker. Dealer vs brand loyalty. If not today, one would expect automobile buyers in the near future to be more brand conscious and less dealer conscious. The logic dictates that dealer loyalty, if there ever was anything like it, will disappear, while brand loyalty may increase. Choice of car will depend on make (since quality and service are equal), while choice of dealer will be based on price (including trade-in, interest rates, distance etc.). Dealer conveniences -facilities, staff capability and effort will be important, but mainly if they are below par. There is of course a sense in which your dealer is loyal to you -and with increased customer attention, this is an area which seems to be increasing in importance. The U.S. auto dealers are soon at the point which Japanese dealers reached early on: Taking the car to someone's house for a test-drive, or picking up a car for service, while handing off a loaner. One wonders if benchmarking and competition will be strong enough against the obvious pressure this places on the dealer's bottom line. It is likely that for most cars in the core of the market, margins 13 will be squeezed far enough for many such accoutrements to prove too expensive to offer. In this new climate, for manufacturers to treat their dealers better than competition seems impossible. Anyway, the same dealer will operate several dealerships for different makes, or simply one large superstore with several makes on the lot. It is more likely that there will be further homogenizing between the services offered for different brands, since the dealer principal can be expected to demand similar support and training for all brands sold. It might be upgraded and state-of-the-art service -but it will not provide any competitive edge for a brand. The reason brand power is becoming more important is not only found on the demand side and an increasingly fickle consumer. A strong brand will also have a better hand in countering the demands made by strong dealer units. The suggestion in the industry media is that a large dealer chain such as Republic's AutoNation, CarMax, or United Auto Group in New York can ask for specially produced and priced cars from manufacturers, presumably to be sold at a reduced price. It is a small step to seeing the possible use of a strong performer such as the Honda Accord as a loss-leading traffic generator in the superstores. Not surprisingly, the manufacturers are uneasy. The loss of control over product positioning must would worry any marketer, and clearly lies behind the Japanese companies suits against Republic. The Internet marketplace. Then there is the Internet complication. At first glance, the possibility of comparison shopping on the Web would seem to go against dealers, just as Amazon.com would seem to hit bookstores hard. But the need for test drives, actually seeing and driving the car, plus the amount of investment involved have played to the dealers' advantage. Even if the margins on new cars are 14 smaller, less time is needed for in-store explanations and demonstrations. As the J.D.Power findings seem to indicate, dealers are on the whole impressed by the enlarged market area they can serve. Again, the data seem to indicate a strong predilection on the part of buyers to focus on strong brands. The top market share holders get the highest number of hits, roughly in proportion to their market shares. This is not necessarily to be expected -one would have thought that the easy accessibility of information on the Internet would lead people to check out options they otherwise would not look at. In addition, it is hard to imagine that the Internet buyers (the 16% who bought a car via the Internet in 1997) are representative of the market as a whole. But the data suggest both premises are wrong -the Internet buyers come from all segments of the market. It is not clear to what extent the emergence of superstores and auto malls is complementary to the Internet evolution. For example, among the 9% of people who in 1997 bought their cars in malls or superstores, how many had first shopped the Internet? My guess is "Very few." One would expect that the Internet shoppers have less need for the superstores. After all, sites such as Auto-by-Tel and AutoVantage represent in fact on-line superstores, and offer immediate access to dealer directories which easily accessible information on prices, availability, and location. The advantage of selection in a superstore is nullified. Thus, it is hardly surprising if the empirical evidence suggests that consumers and dealers have different perceptions of what constitutes a true auto supermarket, with consumers focused on lower prices. They see little need for superstores with non-negotiable prices. 15 Two new choice processes. The restructuring of the auto distribution network in the United States suggests that the consumer now purchases cars according to a different sequence than before. The Internet and the superstores do in fact constitute two alternative paths to the traditional "consideration set" and "dealer visit" chain common in the past. The differences can be clarified best in a simplified flow diagram form. The three alternatives are presented in Exhibit 2. ____________________ Exhibit 2 about here ____________________ The traditional flow diagram is one used by American companies for several years, dating back to the 1960s. The primary tasks in auto marketing have been to get consumer to place the make in the "consideration set" and the get people to "visit the dealer." Using advertising and other promotion to create awareness, in a first step the companies tries to get their brands into the consumer's "evoked set." For newcomers, such as the Japanese back then and Korean's more recently, this was not so difficult -saturation media blitzes can make people aware of Mazda or Hyundai cars. The more difficult part is the next step, to consider the make seriously. "What, a Korean car?" For this, the prospective customer needs to be given information, and motivated to digest it, not so difficult with high involvement purchases such as cars, but still not easy with many competing claims for attention. The dealer visits require not only easily accessible dealerships, but also guarantees of car availability. Sufficient coverage and dealer competition also required more than one dealer per 16 market area, so consumers can feel free to negotiate about prices, trade-in, and financial terms. Usually more than one dealer has to be visited in order to obtain the "best deal." And after-sales service usually became the responsibility of the dealer from whom the car was bought. The new models differ considerably. In the case of Internet shopping, the consumer now does most of the pre-purchase analysis and comparisons at home. The evoked set is enlarged because of the listings of the on-line service, but the consideration set may be quickly reduced to a few models based on brand, country-of-origin, price class, etc. The comparison can be gradually finer and more in-depth -one would expect the Internet shopper to have more information about exactly how two models differ, for example. The dealer visits can also be made on-line, and use very specific criteria, although according to the empirical evidence, price is apparently the most common yardstick for dealer choice. After-sales service is now more a matter of finding a convenient and reliable workshop rather than returning to the low-cost dealer. With independent service units growing up in the wake of superstores, and with the manufacturer's blessing, one can expect independent workshops to become increasingly competitive and attractive. The superstore shopping flow differs in other ways. Here one would expect pre-visit considerations to be of minor importance. Certain segments, especially non-expert segments would be likley to find the "shopping for a car" experience particularly useful, since there is less pressure of the information-intensive Internet environment type ("fill in the blanks and specify the information requested"). Literally "shopping for a car one likes" could thus be the start of the whole buying process. Coupled with the no-hassle sales people and non-negotiable prices, the superstore buyer might be walking out with the car desired, and happily return it for periodic service. On the other hand, when the price savings in alternative channels become large and 17 obvious enough, even the most reluctant car buyer might find that a bit more information search, via Internet or alternative dealers, might pay off. CONCLUSIONS In the end, what will be the effect of these changes on the competitiveness of the Japanese automakers? A first point to be made is that not all manufacturers are affected equally. The consolidation has had the effect of reducing the number of dealers, a result encouraged by the Big Three with their bloated dealer structure. Thus, one could expect that by and large American cars will stand to gain vis-a-vis foreign cars. Second, it is clear that the two leading Japanese car makers -Toyota and Honda -are targeted by both the public firms and the Internet on-line services. Models from these car makers are best sellers, and necessary to have in the line-up for the on-line services as well as for the superstores and auto malls. The step to using them as loss leaders is small. Third, these developments clearly lead to lower distribution flexibility and control by manufacturers. This is most obvious in the case of consolidating dealers and public ownership, where larger countervailing units will face the manufacturers. The on-line Internet services will put pressure on prices at dealers and manufacturers will face requests from suffering and possibly inefficient dealers to provide at least temporary relief. In either case, the manufacturers' ability to manage the distribution of its automobiles will be hampered. If the Japanese car makers still have an advantage in managing their dealer force, this advantage is likely to diminish as conflicts between distribution partners escalate. 18 As was concluded in the "Implications" section, the most obvious solution for the manufacturers is to create, promote and sustain its brand equity among all customers. A powerful brand image and identity will give the manufacturer a stronger hand when dealing with larger dealers, including superstores and publicly or privately owned chains. A power brand will also be a strong bargaining tool when it comes to registration fees and charges on the on-line Internet services. No auto market place in America worth its salt can do without the Toyota Camry and the Honda Accord. Branding power is the protection for Toyota and Honda in the current turmoil -and the problem for Nissan, Mazda and the other Japanese makers. 19SELECTED REFERENCES AIADA (1994). An Analysis of the MOSS Motor Vehicle Study: Market Effort andMarket Access. White paper.Brown, Craig (1998). "Thomason sells controlling interest in company," The Columbian,May 20.Evanoff, Ted (1997). "Dealers doubting clout of marketers." Detroit Free Press, February4.J.D.Power and Associates (1997a). "Auto Malls Fare Better in Both Sales Volume andProfits in J.D.Power and Associates 1997 Auto Mall Study," News release, March 6.----(1997b). "J.D.Power and Associates Reports: Many Prominent Dealers ExpectRepublic, Driver's Mart, and CarMax to Fail," News release, October 8.----(1998a). "Auto-By-Tel Tops New J.D.Power and Associates Study That MeasuresDealer Satisfaction With Online Buying Services," News release, March 2.----(1998b). "J.D.Power and Associates Reports: Consumers Debunk Industry Definitionof Superstores," News release, March 25.Johny K. Johansson & Ikujiro Nonaka (1996). Relentless: The Japanese Way ofMarketing. New York: HarperBusiness.----& Piet Van den Abeele (1998). AMarketing Skill or Luck: The Success of theJapanese Autos in the U.S. Market in the 1970s,@ EMAC Conference Proceedings, Stockholm,Sweden, May.Nikkei (1997). "Acquisitions Reshape U.S. Auto Retailing," Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun,March 18.Rader, James (1980). Penetrating the U.S. Auto Market: German and JapaneseStrategies 1965-76. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press.Wernie, Bradford (1998). "Republic, Honda End Acquisition War," Automotive News,June 15.