Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
If the value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model. 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 55 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006