Generics and Metaphors Unified under a Four-Layer Semantic Theory of Concepts

In this paper, we intend to establish a unified semantics to interpret generics and metaphors. We argue that they have much in common beyond their apparent differences, and that there is no firm line separating the two. This work is carried out in a four-layer semantic structure for concepts. Each layer matches up with semantic entities of a certain type in Montague’s intensional semantics. We argue that a linguistic term denotes a concept and a sense, which are functions. For any given context, the concept denoted by the term specifies its intensions and the sense of the term determines its extensions. Intensions are viewed as sets of senses. In this picture, a concept is no longer traditionally viewed as a container with fixed meanings in it. Rather, a concept is alive and active, dynamic and distributed. Meanings are constructed with respect to different input contexts. Generics extend the intension of the concept expressed by the subject term with the sense of the predicate term. Metaphors transfer part of intension of the vehicle concepts from the established domain to a new domain where the topic concept applies. The results we gain about the semantic interpretation of concepts simultaneously account for generics and metaphors. This proposition unifies logic and rhetoric, separated by Greek philosophy more than 2000 years ago.