Why don't present-biased agents make commitments?
نویسنده
چکیده
*Dept. of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]). The author thanks Nava Ashraf, Daniel Benjamin, Gabriel Carroll, and James Choi for insightful feedback. Outstanding research assistance was provided by Layne Kirshon, Peter Maxted, and Sean Wang. This research was supported by the Pershing Square Fund for Research on the Foundations of Human Behavior and the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health grant awards R01AG021650 and P01AG005842. The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of NIA, NIH, or the Pershing Square Foundation.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- The American economic review
دوره 105 5 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015