Ethics without a Net: a Case Study in How to Do Practical Ethics without Appeal to a Moral Theory

The traditional approach to practical ethics is to take one’s preferred moral theory, say hedonistic utilitarianism or a Kantian theory, and it to some controversial moral issue. Hence, the name “applied ethics”. The name itself suggests that all the important philosophical and ethical work has already been done at the theoretical and metatheoretical level and that practical ethics is just a trivial matter of reading off conclusions from such a theory. The underlying rationale for the traditional approach is the belief that grounding our moral judgments on a correct moral theory is the only way to guarantee the objectivity and correctness of those moral judgments. In short, the moral theory is supposed to serve as a safety net protecting us from subjectivism, relativism and error in our moral judgments. The fundamental weakness of the traditional approach is two-fold: First, the moral theories that are supposed to ground our moral judgments and render them objectively justified are themselves at least as contentious as the moral judgments they’re intended to ground. Second, and more problematic from the standpoint of normative ethics whose is to guide conduct, one can always avoid accepting a burdensome moral judgment simply by rejecting the moral theory on which it is predicated. Perhaps nowhere has this been more obvious than in the recent debate concerning ethical vegetarianism. Most arguments for the moral obligatoriness of vegetarianism take one of two forms. Either they follow Singer’s lead and demand equal consideration for animals on utilitarian grounds, or they follow Regan’s rights-based approach and insist that virtually all of the animals we routinely consume possess the same rights-conferring properties which confer rights on humans. Most philosophers have remained unmoved by these arguments. Like most ordinary people, most philosophers take great pleasure--both gustatory and tactile--out of sinking their teeth into a hot juicy steak, chewing the flesh off a rack of barbequed ribs, and gnawing on spicy chicken wings. Such pleasures are not to be given up lightly. So, it’s not surprising that meat-loving philosophers often casually dismiss these arguments as follows: Singer’s preference utilitarianism is irremediably flawed, as is Regan’s theory of moral rights. Since Singer’s and Regan’s arguments for vegetarianism are predicated on flawed ethical theories, their arguments are also flawed. Until someone can provide me with a correct moral theory that entails that eating meat is wrong, I will continue to eat what I please. The self-serving sophistry of such a reply should be obvious. Since no ethical theory to date is immune to objection, one could fashion a similar reply to “justify” virtually any behavior. One could “justify” rape as follows: An opponent of rape might appeal to utilitarian or Kantian grounds to establish the immorality of rape. Our fictitious rape-loving philosopher could then argue that since these ethical theories are flawed, so too are the arguments against rape. Our rape proponent might then assert: “Until someone can provide me with a correct moral theory that entails that rape is wrong, I will continue to rape whomever I please.” The speciousness of such a “justification” of rape should be transparent. No one who seriously apply