Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games
نویسندگان
چکیده
• Appreciation of a coalition depends respectively on the most preferred and least preferred subcoalition(s). ‣ Preferences satisfy top responsiveness if the following conditions hold: i) each coalition contains a unique most preferred subcoalition (called a choice set); ii) appreciation of a coalition depends on the choice set; iii) if two coalitions have the same choice set, then the smaller coalition is preferred [. Alcalde and Revilla, 2004].
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