Seven INCOMMENSURABILITY AND DEMARCATION

as this does nothing to support the thesis that the members of the two tribes share any important moral beliefs and would not help the absolutist in arguing against relativism. The claim of the absolutist about the Crow and the . . thing is not at all clear. If the relativist contention is expressed as “what is right and what is wrong varies fiom culture to culture,” then whether we are to assent to this proposition will depend entirely upon what we think can be properly substituted into this expression in place of the words “what is right and what is wrong.” Is it “What spectjk actions are morally right when a warrior is lost”? Then the relativist seems to have the right answer. But perhaps it is “What general principles are the morally right ones when a warrior is lost”? If that is the case, then the absolutist may appear to come out right. Everything depends upon what level of analysis one deems appropriate for the application of specifically moral categories. In the last analysis, relativists define themselves in terms of the fact that statements of fact and of value always have a context and are senseless without at least tacit reference to that context. Thus everyone who agrees with this thesis -that fact and value claims make no sense absent a context-is thought, by the relativist, to be a relativist. Absolutists, according to the relativist, must be people who deny this basic fact. Since the fact in question is nearly undeniable, relativists can only conclude that everyone is really a relativist, despite claims to the contrary. Thus, in particular, Amsterdamski’s conclusion about the later work of Karl Popper. But people who think of themselves as absolutists do not characteristically define themselves in this way. Absolutists are not only willing, but eager to acknowledge the importance of context in the making and understanding of fact and value claims. In our story about the Crow and the Apache, the absolutist would urge that we have a solid indication of a moral claim that both tribes agree to, namely, that dead warriors should be given respect and not insulted. How this works out in practice, though, depends upon context. In particular, it depends upon what constitutes insult in the two tribes. Similarly, absolutists might argue that the principle that innocent people should not be hurt for any reason at all might come close to an absolute value. But how this works out in practice will depend, at least, upon who is to be regarded as innocent and which reasons are to be regarded as providing adequate justification for inflicting harm. These issues may be settled differently in different contexts, and some of the differences, at least, may be due to factors that are not themselves specifically moral. --J-”.’. 1 , . --.---.-. -. ..truths and this isn’t one either,” but I must confess I just don’t understand what kind of claim this is. Some would maintain that the function of fact and value claims, by their nature, is entirely rhetorical and that their implicit objective is to move people. But for the sake of which values, and in the face of what kind of reality, may such rhetorical efforts be made? Somewhere in this rhetorical haze must exist something upon which effort may be based-some context that is not itself mere rhetoric. I have no doubt that description-and especially explanation-af the context will necessarily be informed and motivated by the needs and interests of the describer or explainer. But this does not mean that the descriptions and explanations are sheer arbitrary acts of will, either individual or social. An environment, not entirely social (and certainly not entirely dependent upon need and interest), supports all fact and value claims. Indeed, such claims make no sense at all without tacit reference to that environment. In order to make any claims at all, whether of value or of fact, we must presuppose that such claims are at least in some measure independent of the will of whoever makes the claim. They may not ever be entirely independent of the subject, and I would argue that they never can be.5 But neither can they be entirely determined by the subject, whether the subject is conceived individually or as socially constituted. The extreme view that fact and value claims really are solely dependent upon the will and whim of the individual subject (or of society) leaves those subjects (or societies) floating in a vacuum. Since no one really believes that subjects and societies can exist in a vacuum, it follows, according to the absolutist, that no one is really a relativist, in spite of what some people might think. To be a relativist, on this absolutist understanding, is to be committed to incoherence. Hence my initial claim: If the term “relativism” is understood in the way relativists take it, everyone is a relativist. If, on the other hand, one understands “relativism” in the way absolutists do, no one really could consistently be a relativist, despite what they might think. Another misconception is to imagine that absolutists have some particular set of fact and value claims in mind when asserting objective truths. Absolutists include among their number the most uncommitted and uncertain people in the world. I don’t need to know what the truth is in order to be an absolutist; all I need to believe is that my claims are about something, and that these claims are