Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change

The paper discusses concept individuation in the context of scientific concepts and conceptual change in science. It is argued that some concepts can be individuated in different ways. A particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept (which is ascribed to every person from a whole scientific field). But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts (so that each of these concepts is attributed to a smaller group of persons only). The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that underlie a particular study of the change of a scientific term. These interests determine how a concept is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different philosophical studies and interests, its content can be individuated in different ways. HOLISM, CONCEPT INDIVIDUATION, AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 1 The topic of the present discussion is the individuation of concepts. I am primarily interested in scientific concepts and the phenomenon of conceptual change. My account will be based on a moderate holism about concept, using a conceptual role semantics—an approach that I view as fruitful for studying and explaining conceptual change in science, at least in biology. In order to motivate my position, I will briefly look at some recent debates about conceptual role semantics. Jerry Fodor’s and Ernest Lepore’s (1992) critique of conceptual role semantics uses the following basic argument. Given that one rejects conceptual atomism and instead assumes that some inferential relations between expressions are meaning-constitutive, then the following dilemma arises. On the one hand, one could endorse a radical holism, according to which all inferential connections are meaning-constitutive. But Fodor and Lepore offer several arguments against the viability of this option. On the other hand, one could endorse a localism, according to which some, but not all inferences are meaning-constitutive. However, then we need a principled distinction between the meaning-constitutive and non-constitutive inferences, for example, a distinction between analytic and synthetic inferences. Given Quine’s arguments against analyticity and synonymy, Fodor and Lepore assume that it is unlikely that there is any such distinction. Paul Boghossian (1996) replies by arguing that there is a distinction between meaning-constitutive and non-constitutive inferences. For unlike Quine, nowadays virtually everyone is a meaning realist—including Fodor and Lepore. It is usually assumed that there are determinate facts about what expression means what, and thus it is determinate whether two expressions are synonymous or not. This is Boghossian’s reason for claiming that most participants in the debate about content are in fact committed to a distinction between meaning1 I cannot defend this assumption here; but have done so elsewhere. See Brigandt (in prep.a) and (in prep.b). HOLISM, CONCEPT INDIVIDUATION, AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 2 constitutive and non-constitutive features—independent of the fact that it is unclear how to offer a satisfactory account of this distinction. I will endorse a further possible position—moderate holism, which does not assume localism, while avoiding to slide into radical holism. Boghossian’s meaning realism is actually a meaning monism—he assumes that each expression has one precise and objectively given meaning. My rival position is to assume that some concepts can be individuated in different ways, so that one term can have more than one meaning at the same time. The idea is that a particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept (which is ascribed to every person from a whole scientific field). But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts (so that each of these concepts is attributed to a smaller group of persons only). The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that underlie a particular study of the change of a scientific term. These interests determine how a concept is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different philosophical studies and theoretical interests, its content may be individuated in different ways. Thus my account disagrees with the existence of a unique and determinate relation of synonymy and consequently with Boghossian’s monist meaning realism. Nevertheless, this does not mean that my account is a meaning anti-realism. For once we specify the particular interests that underlie an instance of concept ascription, the meaning ascribed is determinate and objective. My position is best viewed as a pluralism about meaning.