Adult guardianship: narrative readings in the "shadow" of the law?

Adult guardianship is not a new idea; the concept was recognized in Roman times (McLaughlin, 1979; Sherman, 1980). Common law adult guardianship originated in the 13th century prerogative powers of the royal courts of England, who could appoint a person known as a “committee” of the person or his property (Krasik, 1989; Neugebauer, 1978). Over much of their life, these powers were administered through an institution of popular justice, the jury; this was later replaced by court adjudication (McLaughlin, 1979). Civil law systems, by contrast, relied more on family members (Blankman, 1997), a priority recently recognized in another way in common law countries through a durable power of attorney legislation that facilitates advance planning (Carney & Tait 1994b; Creyke, 1991). Some civil law schemes have modified or replaced courts with other institutions, as was done for medical consents in New York (Sundram & Stavis, 1998). However, most previous reforms have concentrated on changing the image or philosophy of adult guardianship. In the 1970s, guardianship laws were reformed as deinstitutionalization led to placement of people in the wider community and greater recognition was given to the rights of disabled people. Much of that political energy crystallized around campaigns to improve the lot of the intellectually disadvantaged (Cocks Committee, 1982; Hodgson, 1973; McLaughlin, 1979; Murdock, 1973). 1 The object has been to