Supplement to “ Magical Thinking : A Representation Result ” ( For Online Publication ) Brendan Daley

نویسندگان

  • Brendan Daley
  • Philipp Sadowski
چکیده

This supplement contains extended formal results for Daley and Sadowski (2015) (henceforth DS15). Specifically, §S.1 establishes that in Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) games, the model of DS15 is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). §S.2 provides an axiomatic characterization of F—the perceived distribution of types in the model—being empirically valid when there are infinitely many players. §S.3 extends the axiomatic analysis to symmetric 2⇥2 games beyond PD games. All references to numbered sections/axioms/results/etc. are from DS15, unless otherwise indicated.

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Supplement to “ Magical Thinking : A Representation Result ” ( For Online Publication )

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We provide axiomatic foundations for a simple model of play in prisoners’ dilemma games. The model accommodates cooperation and suggests that players behave as if their expectations about their opponents’ behavior vary with their own choice. We refer to this nonstandard updating as magical thinking. The degree to which players exhibit magical thinking may be heterogeneous in the population and ...

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تاریخ انتشار 2016