On the Semantics of Existence Predicates

The most common philosophical view about the notion of existence is that it is a second-order property or existential quantification. A less common view is that existence is a (first-order) property of 'existent' as opposed to 'nonexistent' (past or merely intentional) objects. An even less common view is that existence divides into different 'modes of being' for different sorts of entities. In this paper I will take a closer look at the semantic behavior of existence predicates in natural language, such as exist, occur, and obtain, arguing that existence predicates in natural language support the two less common philosophical views. I will develop explicit analyses of existence predicates in their time-relative and space-relative uses which will explain why they apply to some kinds of entities, but not others. The most common philosophical view of existence is that existence amounts to existential quantification (the Quinean tradition) or is a second-order concept (the Kant-Frege tradition). A less common philosophical view is that existence is a first-order property distinguishing between nonexistent (past, possible, or merely intentional) objects and existing objects. An even less common philosophical view is that existence divides into different ‘modes of being’ for different kinds of entities (a view held, for example, by Aristotle, Heidegger, Sarte, Ryle, and more recently McDaniel). The aim of the present paper is to take a closer look at how the notion of existence is in fact expressed in natural language. In natural language, it appears, existence is not so much expressed by quantification, which can be shown to be neutral as regards any distinction between existent and nonexistent objects that one might draw. Rather existence is expressed by predicates, and that is, first-order predicates. Furthermore, there is, at least in English, no single existence predicate, but rather at least three: exist, occur (or related predicates such as happen or take place), and obtain. The semantic behavior of such existence predicates (regarding the kinds of entities that they can apply to and the sorts of 




























































 1 For a recent defense of the Quinean view, see van Inwagen (1998). For a recent defense of a view of existence dividing into different modes of being see McDaniel (to appear a, b).