Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 the Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanism by Simple Voting Schemes

نویسندگان

  • John O. Ledyard
  • Thomas R. Palfrey
چکیده

This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called referenda, to the performance of interim eÆcient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespeci ed threshold. Costs are shared equally. We show that in large populations for any interim eÆcient allocation rule, there exists a corresponding referendum that yields approximately the same total welfare when there are many individuals. Moreover, if there is a common value component to the voters' preferences, then there is a unique approximating referendum. JEL Classi cation numbers: D61, D82, H41

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تاریخ انتشار 2001