When in Rome : conformity and the 5 provision of public goods
نویسنده
چکیده
9 We ask whether conformity, copying the most observed behavior in a population, affects free riding. 10 Our model suggests that, if sufficiently frequent at the start of a public goods game, conformity will 11 increase the growth rate of free riding. We confirm this prediction in an experiment by showing that 12 free riding grows faster when players have the information necessary to conform. As a stricter test, 13 we econometrically estimate the dynamic on which the model is based and find that, controlling for 14 the payoff incentive to free ride, players react significantly to the number of free riders in their groups. 15 © 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc. 16 JEL classification: C72; C92; H41 17
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