QnAs with Robert Townsend.

Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

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Village Economic Accounts: Real and Financial Intertwined

Using the household panel data from Townsend Thai data, we create the economic and balance of payments accounts for a set of villages in rural and semiurban areas of Thailand. We then study these village economies as small open countries, as in international economics, exploring in particular the relationship between the real (production and trade) and financial (credit and financial flows) var...

Financial Structure and Economic Activity

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Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions: Technical Appendix

In our paper “Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions,” we develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent models with hidden income and hidden actions. This appendix provides the detailed derivations of all recursive formulations presented in the paper, as well as proofs for all propositions. Matthias Doepke: Department of Econ...

Evaluating the Impact of Financial Services in Mexico: A Proposal using a Structural Equilibrium Approach I