Sequential Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Private Monitoring
نویسنده
چکیده
We analyze the infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. The efficient outome can be approximated in any prisoners’ dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of prisoner dilemma games. Our results require that monitoring be sufficiently accurate but do not require very low discounting.
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