Assignment Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
Assignment Auctions Paul Milgrom April 10, 2008 Abstract. We propose a new auction for selling goods that are close substitutes. The design is a direct mechanism that is compact, easy to implement, respects integer constraints, and is a “tight” simplification of a standard direct competitive mechanism. Connections are established between the assignment auction and the Vickrey auction, the uniform price auction for a single product, and an ascending multi-product clock auction.
منابع مشابه
Assignment Exchanges
Assignment Exchanges Paul Milgrom September 6, 2008 Abstract. We analyze assignment exchanges –auction and exchange mechanisms which are tight simplifications of direct Walrasian exchange mechanisms. These simplifications are distinguished by their use of “assignment messages,” which parameterize certain substitutable preferences. The “basic” assignment exchanges respect integer constraints, ge...
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