On the Place of Virtues in a Pluralistic Democracy

If a community recognizes a set of moral values and commitments as compelling, as virtues, these become the foundations of moral discourse in that community. Other statements, new moral claims, and so on-as long as they are not absorbed into the set of shared virtues-have no or little standing. And, while there are frequently differences in interpreting the exact meanings and implications of prevailing virtues-for instance, how much is due to charity?-virtues do provide sound and shared foundations for consensus formation, community endeavors, public policies and moral standing. For example, in the traditional European Jewish shtetl, studying the scriptures was accorded high virtue. It left little doubt as to which activities were to be extolled and merited the seat nearest the preferred Eastern (oriented to Jerusalem) wall of the synagogue. It was not a question of the rights of one subgroup versus those of others but a communitywide recognition of the virtue of commitments to the scriptures. Also, in canmunities that sub~ribe to shared virtues (orcommunitarian values), contentiousness and litigiousness are curbed as relatively clear and shared criteria are available to resolve differences. Finally, the cynicism of "anythinggoes as long as it satisfies a deal among the interpreted parties" is avoided.