Perceived rationality, morality, and power of social choice as a function of interdependence structure and social value orientation

The present study examines how individuals with different social value orientations (i.e. prosocial, individualistic, and competitive) construe the rationality, morality, and power of choices in four distinct interdependence structures which systematically differ in the motives that could underlie the most prosocial or least aggressive choice: (a) altruism only, (b) altruism and cooperation, (c) altruism, cooperation, and individualism, and (d) altruism, cooperation, individualism, and competition. Results revealed that rationality ratings, and to a lesser degree morality and power ratings, increased most when the motives that could underlie a choice were part of the perceiver’s social value orientation. Overall, the pattern of rationality ratings provided reasonable support for the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle. Ratings of morality and power suggested a corresponding Goal Prescribes Morality/Power Principle (for prosocials and individualists), but revealed only mixed support for the Might Over Morality Hypothesis. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. The ways in which conflicts of interests are solved and fruitful cooperation is established and maintained is importantly determined by whether individuals seek to enhance joint outcomes along with equality (Van Lange, 1999) in outcomes (prosocial orientation), their personal outcomes (individualistic orientation), or their relative advantage over others (competitive orientation). These three types of social value orientation (McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968) are predictive of cooperative and competitive behavior in experimental games and social dilemmas (e.g. Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986b; Parks, 1994), willingness to sacrifice in close relationships (Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997), helping behavior (McClintock & Allison, 1989), negotiation (De Dreu, & Received 25 May 2001 Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 7 October 2002 *Correspondence to: Jeffrey A. Joireman, Department of Psychology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4820, USA. E-mail: [email protected] Van Lange, 1995), and real-life social dilemmas (Joireman, Van Lange, Kuhlman, Van Vugt, & Shelley, 1997; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995). During the past two decades some lines of research have started to devote attention to the ways in which prosocials, individualists, and competitors construe behavior in settings of interdependence (e.g. Beggan, Messick, & Allison, 1988; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986a; Kuhlman, Brown, & Teta, 1992; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Consistent with some basic principles of interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), these lines of research focusing on construal have provided good evidence that prosocials, individualists, and competitors differ in the meaning they attach to cooperative versus noncooperative behavior. This research suggests the importance of three dimensions of construal—morality, rationality, and power—which are similar to the classic dimensions of evaluation (morality) and potency (power) identified by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957), and the dimensions of social desirability (morality) and intellectual desirability (rationality) identified in the literature on person perception and implicit personality theories (e.g. Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Schneider, 1973). The purpose of the present study is to understand how individuals with prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations construe the rationality, morality, and power of the most benevolent (or least aggressive) choice across four distinct interdependence structures: (a) convergence (contrasting altruism with cooperation, individualism, competition, and aggression), (b) prisoner’s dilemma (contrasting altruism and cooperation with individualism, competition, and aggression), (c) maximizing difference (contrasting altruism, cooperation, and individualism with competition and aggression), and (d) malice (contrasting altruism, cooperation, individualism, and competition, with aggression). We have chosen to focus on these particular structures for two reasons. First, these structures, while not comprehensive, arguably reflect a number of important decisions individuals face in everyday life. Second, as detailed below, these structures can be arranged along a theoretically meaningful continuum that systematically varies in terms of the personal and social well-being afforded by the choice alternatives. This ordering of structures subsequently allows for an examination of how people’s views regarding morality, rationality, and power are influenced by three types of gain—joint, own, and relative gain—underlying the three most common social value orientations—prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations, respectively. SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION: CONSTRUAL OF INTERDEPENDENT CHOICE Construal: From Given to Effective Matrix By definition, interdependent individuals are faced with options that impact both their own and another’s well-being. The pattern of outcomes resulting from those options (i.e. the interdependence structure) can vary from situation to situation, as can the individuals faced with a given structure. As a result, each individual’s evaluation (or ‘construal’) of the available options within a given interdependence structure is likely to be influenced by features of both the situation (i.e. what each option objectively affords) and the person (e.g. the individuals’ values, beliefs, motives). To differentiate between the ‘objective’ situation and an individual’s ‘subjective’ construal of that situation, interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) posits two conceptually distinct interdependence structures. The given matrix represents individual outcomes determined by the situation in combination with each individual’s needs, skills, etc. The effective (or transformed) matrix, by contrast, represents the incorporation of broader considerations, considerations based in part on an individual’s social value orientation (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Past research suggests that social 414 Jeffrey A. Joireman et al. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 33, 413–437 (2003) value orientation may impact the transformation from given to effective matrix (i.e. the construal of interdependent choice) in at least two ways. Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle According to the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand, & Kuhlman, 1990), social value orientation shapes an individual’s view regarding the most rational course of action in interdependent settings: prosocials are assumed to view cooperation (i.e. the pursuit of joint gain) as rational, whereas proselfs (individualists and competitors) are assumed to view noncooperation (i.e., the pursuit of individual or relative gain) as rational (cf. Kahan, 1974). Several lines of research support this idea. For example, the higher level of cooperation evidenced by prosocials in the prisoner’s dilemma indirectly suggests that individuals with different social value orientations hold differing definitions of rationality (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Additional evidence consistent with this idea demonstrates that individuals predisposed to cooperate (defect) in the prisoner’s dilemma judge another person as more (less) intelligent when that person has made a cooperative choice (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange et al., 1990), and that prosocials expect more cooperation from a person who is described as intelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expect more cooperation from a person described as unintelligent (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991a). Might Over Morality Hypothesis According to the Might Over Morality Hypothesis (Liebrand et al., 1986a), social value orientation influences the relative importance individuals attach to the dimensions of morality and power: prosocials are assumed to frame decision making in terms of morality, whereas individualists (and competitors) are assumed to frame decision making in terms of power. Globally speaking, cooperation is viewed as more moral than noncooperation, and noncooperation is viewed as more powerful than cooperation (Liebrand, et al., 1986a). However, several studies suggest that individuals differ in the relative importance they attach to these two dimensions. For example, Liebrand et al. (1986a) have demonstrated that, relative to individualists, prosocials differentiate between ‘cooperative’ actions (i.e. altruism and cooperation) and ‘competitive’ actions (i.e. individualism and competition) more in terms of morality, whereas, relative to prosocials, individualists differentiate between such actions more in terms of power. Subsequent research, which has tended to assume that competitors also emphasize the power dimension, has provided mixed support for the Might Over Morality Hypothesis; some studies support both predictions (e.g. Kuhlman et al., 1992; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), others support only the morality prediction (e.g. Beggan et al., 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1990), and others support only the might prediction (e.g. McClintock & Liebrand, 1988).