Moral emotions

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account. Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view, this has been to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only relevant for the moral evaluation of persons (we judge a person ceteris paribus more negatively when she is pleased about someone’s harm than when she feels sorry for him), they are also important for value theory and thus for the theory of morally right actions (to promote the happiness of others is, according to most normative ethical theories, at least prima facie right). However, in this paper I deal only with one problem of this broad field of research. I will neither be concerned with the issue of the essence of emotions, nor will I attempt to define some specific moral emotions (for example, moral guilt); and I will also not deal with the problem of how differ1 This neglect has also been criticised e.g. by Oakley 1992, Stocker and Hegeman 1996 and Williams 1978. 2 See, for instance, Adams 1988 and Stocker and Hegeman (1996, 152-60). 3 This issue has been investigated e.g. by Broad 1971, Greenspan 1993, Oakley 1992 and Warnock 1957. 4 There are investigations about this e.g. from Bollnow 1962, Mees 1991 and