Pure Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) has been widely used by search engines to sell ad slots. Previous studies have shown that the pure Price Of Anarchy (POA) of GSP is 1.25 when there are two ad slots and 1.259 when three ad slots. For the cases with more than three ad slots, however, only some untight upper bounds of the pure POA were obtained. In this work, we improve previous results in two aspects: (1) We prove that the pure POA for GSP is 1.259 when there are four ad slots, and (2) We show that the pure POA for GSP with more than four ad slots is also 1.259 given the bidders are ranked according to a particular permutation.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1305.5404 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013