Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
نویسنده
چکیده
The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative, is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.
منابع مشابه
Characterization of additive cost sharing methods ∗ Hervé Moulin and Rakesh Vohra April 2003
The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative, is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.
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