Policy Dynamics and Legislative Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper presents a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an evolving default policy. We show that even with a fixed proposer proposal power is limited in equilibrium. Moreover, legislators have induced preferences over the distribution of benefits. We then apply the model to entitlement policies and models of public good production. Our results provide an explanation for the "ratchet effect" of public spending in multi-party parliamentary democracies. ∗Department of Managerical Economics and Decision Science (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. †Department of Economics, Concordia University.
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